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ABSTRACT
We propose a novel framework for measuring and evaluating
location privacy preserving mechanisms in mobile wireless
networks. Within this framework, we first present a formal
model of the system, which provides an efficient represen-
tation of the network users, the adversaries, the location
privacy preserving mechanisms and the resulting location
privacy of the users. This model is general enough to ac-
curately express and analyze a variety of location privacy
metrics that were proposed earlier. By using the proposed
model, we provide formal representations of four metrics
among the most relevant categories of location privacy met-
rics. We also present a detailed comparative analysis of these
metrics based on a set of criteria for location privacy mea-
surement. Finally, we propose a novel and effective metric
for measuring location privacy, called the distortion-based
metric, which satisfies these criteria for privacy measure-
ment and is capable of capturing the mobile users’ location
privacy more precisely than the existing metrics. Our met-
ric estimates location privacy as the expected distortion in
the reconstructed users’ trajectories by an adversary.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General—
Security and protection; K.4.1 [Computers and Society]:
Public Policy Issues—Privacy
General Terms
Security, Measurement
1. INTRODUCTION
The recent popularity of location-based data sharing ap-
plications, together with the rapid proliferation of wireless
mobile devices equipped with advanced communication ca-
pabilities, has fueled the emergence of context-aware, location-
based applications and services on these devices. Applica-
tions that take advantage of the device-to-device communi-
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cation capabilities of these devices in order to share location-
based data among each other, e.g., [1, 2, 3], or the device-to-
infrastructure capabilities to request/report location-based
data from/to the service providers, e.g., [25, 30], are now
available and widely used. Despite their popularity, privacy
issues such as leakage of one’s location information to service
providers, without the user’s consent, or to external eaves-
droppers [9, 10] is a major concern in these applications.
Privacy concerning the users’ locations, also termed lo-
cation privacy, has been formally defined in the literature
in the context of such pervasive location-based applications
and services. Beresford and Stajano [7] define location pri-
vacy as the ability to prevent other parties from learning
one’s current or past location. In order to protect location
privacy, several mechanisms have been proposed in the liter-
ature. These privacy preserving mechanisms provide various
methods (e.g., anonymization [10], pseudonym change [6],
path perturbation [20]) that could be implemented either
centrally on the trusted third-party servers or on the indi-
vidual mobile devices themselves to prevent an adversary
from trivially learning the users’ past or current locations.
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of these location pri-
vacy preserving mechanisms, in terms of correctness in mea-
suring or quantifying the notion of“location privacy”, several
metrics [12, 15, 19, 20, 21, 22, 32] are proposed in the liter-
ature. Ideally, a location privacy metric should capture the
amount of information an adversary has about users’ actual
trajectories (or positions). In other words, the location pri-
vacy metric should be able to measure the inability of a given
adversary in accurately tracking the mobile users over space
and time. However, existing location privacy metrics in the
literature do not completely capture this notion of location
privacy and are too specific to particular privacy preserving
mechanisms. Moreover, some of these metrics for location
privacy preserving mechanisms inspired from other domains
such as anonymous communication or database security are
not able to correctly capture the notion of location privacy
because privacy in these domains is defined in a slightly dif-
ferent way than in the context of mobile networks.
The intuition behind location privacy can easily be con-
veyed by drawing an analogy to a general communication
system in which some information sent by a transmitter is
first encoded before being sent over a communication chan-
nel to the receiver who tries to decode it in order to recon-
struct the encoded information. The quality of this commu-
nication depends upon how accurately the receiver is able
to decode the information (even in the presence of errors)
from the transmitted data. The analogy here is that a lo-
cation privacy preserving mechanism can be viewed as the
communication channel encoder that transforms the pass-
ing location data. The transmitter is the mobile network of
users who transmit their location information, whereas the
adversary is analogous to the receiver who wants to recon-
struct the users’ trajectories or locations after their transfor-
mation through the privacy preserving mechanism. Hence,
the quality of the location privacy provided by a location
privacy preserving mechanism depends on how unsuccessful
the adversary is in reconstructing the users’ locations over
time. We argue that the higher the distortion between the
expected reconstructed trajectory and the actual trajectory
of the users is, the better their location privacy will be. The
location privacy metric that we propose in this paper, unlike
earlier metrics, considers this distortion in order to measure
the location privacy of mobile users.
In this paper, we have two main contributions. First, we
propose an analytical framework for formally representing
our location privacy metric, which includes representation
of system elements such as the mobile device network, the
privacy preserving mechanism and the adversary. The pro-
posed framework is also general enough to formally express
other location privacy metrics in the literature. We then
evaluate the effectiveness of these metrics in correctly quan-
tifying location privacy based on a set of criteria that we
derive from the definition of location privacy in mobile net-
works. Based on this evaluation, we argue that existing
location privacy metrics do not effectively capture the no-
tion of location privacy, especially from the point of view
of the accuracy of an adversary in tracking users. Our sec-
ond contribution is a novel location privacy metric, called
the distortion-based metric, that measures a user’s location
privacy at any time by considering the level of distortion in
each part of the user’s reconstructed trajectory by the ad-
versary. We believe that such a distortion-based metric cap-
tures the notion of location privacy much more accurately
and satisfies most of the criteria for accurate representation
of location privacy in mobile networks.
2. SYSTEMMODEL
In this section, we present a formal framework for mod-
eling mobile users, location privacy preserving mechanisms
and the adversary. In the following section, we will use this
model to express and analyze the location privacy metrics.
2.1 Mobile Networks
A mobile wireless network consists of a set of mobile users
equipped with wireless devices. The set of users in the sys-
tem is denoted by U , where n = |U| is the number of users.
All the users are associated with two types of identities: ac-
tual identities and pseudonyms.
A user’s actual identity is any subset of his attributes (e.g.,
his name, his national identity number, his user name or his
private key) that uniquely identifies the user within any set
of users in the system [29]. We assume that each user has
one, unique, actual identity. The set of all the users’ actual
identities is denoted by I. We define a bijective function
name : U → I that maps each user with his actual identity.
Each user is also associated with a set of pseudonyms.
A user’s pseudonyms are different from his actual identity.
The user to whom a particular pseudonym refers is called the
holder of the pseudonym [29]. A pseudonym is called a group
pseudonym if it refers to a set of holders [11]. Therefore, the
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(a) Geographic space (b) Graph Gs
Figure 1: Example of geographic space. The space
is divided into grids and contains the road network
which is modeled in a discrete way by graph Gs.
set of pseudonyms held by a user is not necessarily disjoint
from that of other users. The set of all pseudonyms used by
all the users is denoted by Î, where Î ∩I = ∅. We define the
function nyms : U → P(Î) to give the set of pseudonyms
associated with each user, where P(Î) is the power set of
Î. The null pseudonym, denoted by , is a pseudonym in
Î that represents the status of being identity-less (when a
user’s identity is removed from his communicating messages
without being replaced by one of his pseudonyms, for exam-
ple in full anonymization by a proxy). We will show its use
later when we explain the privacy preserving mechanisms.
The notion of time that we employ in this model is dis-
crete, using a global clock, where each unit of time is called
a time instance. The set of considered time instances is
denoted by T = {1, 2, · · · , T}, where T represents the last
considered time instance in the system.
We model the geographic space in which users move, in a
discrete way, as a graph Gs = (V s, Es), where V s is the set
of vertices and each vertex denotes a location (region) in the
users geographic space. The set Es is the set of edges of the
graph and is defined as follows. There is an edge between two
vertices if the location pairs represented by those vertices are
directly connected to each other, for example, by means of
direct roads or direct transport links. In this model, there
is a physical route between two locations if there is a path
in the graph that connects their associated vertices to each
other. Figure 1 illustrates a geographic space and its corre-
sponding graph that is used as an example throughout the
paper. A set of locations can be combined to a location area.
Thus, a location area is visualized as a subset of V s.
Note that the granularity of time depends on the level of
accuracy we expect from the model. The same holds for the
considered locations in the modeled geographic space. For
example, time units can be hours, or days, and the space
can also be divided into arbitrarily sized regions in the map.
As users are mobile, their location is a time-dependent
value. Let whereis : U × T → V s be a function that gives
the actual location of a user at any time instance. Note that
this function reflects the very exact location of each user,
regardless of the knowledge of any entity about it.
2.2 Events and Traces
In this section, we present part of our formal framework
that models the users’ spatiotemporal status. It can repre-
sent both the users’ actual status (defined in this section)
y
1
4v:
eu,4
2
3 42
3eu,3
ev,1
ev,2
1eu,1
eu,2 ev,3 ev,4
x
u:
y
2
4
3
êv,2
êu,3
1êu,1
êv,4
x
(a) (b)
Figure 2: Actual and observed events for two users
u and v crossing at an intersection. The circles show
the events and the associated number indicates their
time-stamp. (a) Actual events. The arrows indicate
the users’ movement direction. (b) Observed events
and the linkability graph Gl. The arrows indicate
the edges in graph Gl.
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Figure 3: Actual trace R is transformed to R̂ by a
location privacy preserving mechanism. After the
observation, a specific adversary obtains a subset
of R̂, denoted by R̂|obs. A location privacy metric
must reflect the degree of the adversary’s success in
reconstructing R from R̂|obs.
and also the status of the users from an observer’s perspec-
tive (defined in Sections 2.3 and 2.4).
An event is defined as a 3-tuple (i, t, l), where i ∈ I∪Î is a
user’s identity (either actual or pseudonym), t represents the
time instance at which the event occurred (referred to as the
time-stamp of the event), and l ∈ P(V s) is the location area
associated with the event (referred to as the location-stamp
of the event), where P(V s) is the power set of V s. Let E
denote the set of all possible events. Let id : E → I∪Î, tm :
E → T , and loc : E → P(V s) be the functions that give the
identity, time-stamp, and location-stamp of an event, i.e.,
for any event e ≡ (i, t, l) we have id(e) = i, tm(e) = t, and
loc(e) = l. The relation happens before, denoted by ei ≺ ej ,
exists between events ei and ej only if tm(ei) < tm(ej).
A trace is defined as a non-empty set of events. Consider a
trace Υ ∈ P(E)\{∅}. For any two distinct events ei, ej ∈ Υ,
if ei ≺ ej and @ ek ∈ Υ s.t. ei ≺ ek ≺ ej then the event
ei is called an immediate predecessor of the event ej , and is
denoted by ei 4Υ ej . In this case, the event ej is called the
immediate successor of the event ei. We use ei 4 ej instead
of ei 4Υ ej if the trace Υ is clear from the context.
Let f be any function that is defined over events (e.g.,
tm, id, loc). Its image function
−→
f for a trace Υ is defined
as
−→
f (Υ) = {f(e) | e ∈ Υ}. The set of events in a trace
Υ with time-stamp less than or equal to t is denoted by
Υ≤t = {e ∈ Υ | tm(e) ≤ t}. For a trace Υ, we define
head(Υ) = {e ∈ Υ | tm(e) = min(−→tm(Υ))} and similarly
tail(Υ) = {e ∈ Υ | tm(e) = max(−→tm(Υ))}. In other words,
the head (or tail) of the trace is the set of events with the
smallest (or largest) time-stamp.
An event e is called an actual event associated with a user
u if id(e) = name(u) and loc(e) = {whereis(u, t)}, where
tm(e) = t. Note that there is no uncertainty and inaccu-
racy about where such events occur. The actual trace of a
user u, denoted by Ru, represents his entire actual trajec-
tory. It is defined as the set of the user’s actual events, i.e.,
Ru = {(name(u), t, {whereis(u, t)}) | t ∈ T }. Figure 2(a)
represents an example for the actual events of two users u
and v in the geographic space previously shown in Figure 1
during time instances {1, 2, 3, 4}.
We define relation ∼ between two actual events ei and ej ,
denoted by ei ∼ ej , if and only if they are associated with
the same user (i.e., ∃u ∈ U s.t. ei, ej ∈ Ru).
The actual trace of a system is the union of all users’ ac-
tual traces and is denoted by R, i.e., R = ⋃uRu. Notice
that ∀u, v ∈ U we have Ru ∩Rv = ∅. Therefore, the equiv-
alence relation ∼ partitions the trace R into subsets, each
representing the actual trace of one user. We refer to the set
partition associated with ∼ as the actual set partition of R.
2.3 Location Privacy Preserving Mechanisms
In this section, we formalize the location privacy preserv-
ing mechanism in the system. We formally define location
privacy preserving mechanisms as transformation functions
that modify or hide the users’ actual events before they could
be observable by any observer. Such a mechanism can work
in a distributed way by being implemented on individual mo-
bile devices, in a centralized manner by using a proxy server
that modifies the users’ messages, or by using a hybrid tech-
nique. In our model, we abstract away the implementation
details of privacy preserving mechanisms.
Let the location privacy preserving mechanisms be de-
noted by function trns : R → E ∪ {hidden}, where hidden
stands for a hidden event (i.e., an unobservable event). The
output of the transformation function
−−→
trns(R) on the actual
trace is called the system’s observable trace and is denoted
by R̂, i.e., R̂ = −−→trns(R) \ {hidden}. As it is shown in
Figure 3, privacy preserving mechanisms perform the trans-
formation function by means of three methods: elimination,
obfuscation, and anonymization.
One method is the elimination, by which a subset of events
in the actual trace R is selected to be eliminated and thus
to become hidden (i.e., trns replaces the eliminated events
by hidden element in the actual trace R).
Another method is the obfuscation, by which the location-
stamp or time-stamp of a subset of the events in the actual
trace R is altered. Using the obfuscation methods results in
the inaccuracy or imprecision of the location- or time-stamp
of the events [13]. The location/time information obfusca-
tion can be achieved mostly through methods such as pertur-
bation [19, 22] or generalization (e.g., [4] or k-anonymity [16,
19]). In this paper, we only focus on location obfuscation,
leaving time obfuscation as future work.
Lastly, using the anonymization method, the identity of
a subset of events in the actual trace R is altered. In this
phase, the actual identity of a user on an event is replaced by
one of his pseudonyms and can change over time. We cap-
ture the state of being identity-less by the null pseudonym
. In other words, for an identity-less event e we have
id(e) = . Making the events identity-less is implemented
in proxy-based mechanisms where the users’ identities are
removed before the events become observable to any dis-
trusted entity.
We denote the observable trace of a user u ∈ U by R̂u =−−→
trns(Ru). Thus, R̂ = ⋃u R̂u, where R̂ is the outcome of
the transformation function (i.e., the observable trace).
If two actual events ei and ej are associated with the same
user (i.e., ei ∼ ej) and eˆi = trns(ei) and eˆj = trns(ej), then
we define a relation ∼o between eˆi and eˆj . In other words,
we define eˆi ∼o eˆj if eˆi, eˆj ∈ R̂u for some u ∈ U .
2.4 Adversary
In our framework, the adversary is any entity that ob-
serves events after the transformation process. Thus, it has
access to a subset of R̂, called the observed trace and denoted
by R̂|obs (i.e., R̂|obs ⊆ R̂). We denote by R̂u|obs the ob-
served trace associated with user u ∈ U , i.e., the transformed
version of his actual trace. The set of all time instances in
which the adversary observes any event in the system is de-
noted by T |obs = −→tm(R̂|obs). Accordingly, we define the
time instances for R̂u|obs as Tu|obs = −→tm(R̂u|obs).1
The extent to which an adversary can observe the observ-
able events depends on its capabilities. For the most power-
ful adversary (known as the global adversary) the observed
trace is equal to the observable trace, i.e., R̂|obs = R̂.
With access to the observed trace R̂|obs, the adversary’s
objective is to reconstruct the actual trace R as accurately
as possible and to eventually identify the users to whom each
trace belong. For any given user u, the more accurately the
adversary can reconstruct his actual trace Ru, especially in
location/time pairs containing more information about the
user (e.g., the user’s home place in the evening, or his work-
place in the morning), the higher the probability of disclos-
ing his actual identity name(u) is. [18, 27]
The adversary is assumed to have prior knowledge about
the events and traces that may be possible in the system.
More precisely, the adversary knows the mobility model of
the network. It knows the geographic space in which the mo-
bile users move and also the possible routes that connect the
different locations together (i.e., graph Gx). The adversary
can model the users’ movement in the considered space and
subsequently assign probabilities to the following events: (i)
some user or a specific user is in a region at a specific time
instance, and (ii) a user moves from one location to another
location at specific time instances. Moreover, the adversary
knows what kind of privacy preserving mechanism is used
in the system. We do not assume anything about how the
adversary obtains this knowledge and how accurate it is.
Given the capabilities of the adversary and the observed
trace R̂|obs, the adversary’s goal is to carry out the recon-
struction attack (i.e., to reconstruct the actual trace), which
is probabilistic in nature. The adversary assigns probabil-
ities to possible related events in order to reconstruct the
users’ trajectories. Throughout the paper, we denote the
probability with which the adversary considers a statement
1Note that subscript u is used in our model to refer to the
events and traces associated with user u and it does not
mean that the adversary is able to make that association.
s to be true by PrA(s). For example, PrA(eˆi ∼o eˆj) gives the
probability that the adversary believes that two observed
events eˆi and eˆj are associated with the same user (i.e.,
eˆi, eˆj ∈ R̂u|obs for some user u). In fact, we represent the
adversary’s knowledge by PrA(.). However, the construction
of an adversary’s knowledge (i.e., computing the values of
PrA(.)) is out of the scope of this paper.
2.5 Location Privacy Measurement
In order to represent various location privacy metrics in
our model, we need a new data structure. To this end, we
define a probabilistic graph called the linkability graph that
represents the linkability of observed events based on the
adversary’s knowledge .
The linkability graph is a directed graph Gl = (V l, El, pil),
where V l and El are the set of vertices and edges, respec-
tively, and pil : V l×V l → [0, 1] is a weight function that de-
fines the edges of the graph. The set of vertices in the graph
is equal to the set of observed events by the adversary, i.e.,
V l = R̂|obs. In other words, there is a vertex in the graph Gl
corresponding to each observed event in R̂|obs. The edges of
the graph are defined based on the weight function pil as fol-
lows: there is an edge between two vertices eˆi and eˆj if and
only if pil(eˆi, eˆj) > 0. For distinct observed events eˆi and
eˆj , weight function pi
l(eˆi, eˆj) represents the probability with
which the adversary believes that both events are associated
with the same user (i.e., eˆi ∼o eˆj) and eˆi is an immediate
predecessor of eˆj in some user’s observed trace (i.e., eˆi 4 eˆj).
Hence, pil(eˆi, eˆj) = PrA((eˆi ∼o eˆj) ∧ (eˆi 4 eˆj)). Moreover,
pil(eˆi, eˆi) gives the probability that eˆi is the last event ob-
served from a user. The sum of the linkability probabilities
assigned to the outgoing edges from each vertex is equal to
1, i.e., ∀eˆi ∈ V l we have ∑j pil(eˆi, eˆj) = 1. Figure 2(b)
represents an example of the observed events from u and v
(shown in Figure 2(a)) and the associated linkability graph.
The set of vertices in any path in the linkability graph is
a trace (based on the definition of traces). Let trace Υij be
a path between eˆi and eˆj in the linkability graph G
l. The
weight (i.e., probability) assigned to Υij , i.e., the probability
that all the events in the trace are associated with the same
user and the trace covers all the observed events eˆk of that
particular user such that tm(eˆi) < tm(eˆk) < tm(eˆj), is
denoted by pil∗(Υij).
Finally, we give the notations that will be used to denote
the location privacy measured by different metrics at differ-
ent granularities. Let x be a metric that is used to measure
location privacy. The overall system level location privacy
is denoted by LPx. The overall location privacy of any user
u is denoted by LPxu. The location privacy of any user u at
time instance t is denoted by LPxu(t).
3. EXISTING METRICS
We outline four relevant categories of location privacy
metrics in this section. First, we describe these metrics by
using the formalization that we establish in Section 2. Next,
we study the effectiveness of these metrics in capturing the
location privacy using a set of criteria.
3.1 Description of the Metrics
In this section, we describe the following classes of loca-
tion privacy metrics: uncertainty-based metrics (u-metrics),
“clustering error”-based metrics (c-metrics), traceability-based
metrics (t-metrics), and k-anonymity metrics (k-metrics).
3.1.1 Uncertainty-Based Metric
This metric was originally proposed by Diaz et al. [12] and
Serjantov and Danezis [32] to measure privacy in anonymous
communication systems. In their setting, the adversary’s
aim is to identify the sender and/or receiver of a transferred
message. Each user is assigned a probability for being the
possible sender/receiver of the message. The entropy [33]
of the random variable that is associated with the users’
probabilities is considered as the system’s anonymity level.
Thus, the metric captures the uncertainty (measured by the
entropy) of the adversary in the identification process.
This metric has been widely used for measuring location
privacy as well (e.g., [6, 8, 23, 24, 26, 28]). The location
privacy of a given user is computed as the uncertainty of
the adversary in linking the user’s observed events.
Let u be a user in U and consider an event eˆi ∈ R̂u|obs.
Let a random variable Xi represent the probability that any
eˆj , as another observed event, is the immediate successor
of eˆi. In other words, we have PrA(Xi = j) = pi
l(eˆi, eˆj) for
any j such that (eˆi, eˆj) ∈ El in the linkability graph Gl. The
entropy of Xi, denoted by H(Xi), is computed as follows.
H(Xi) = −
∑
j
PrA(Xi = j) · log2(PrA(Xi = j))
In the u-metrics, as shown below, this entropy value is con-
sidered as the privacy of user u at time instance tm(eˆi).
LPuu(tm(eˆi)) = H(Xi) (1)
3.1.2 “Clustering Error”-Based Metrics
Observing that u-metrics are not fully appropriate for
measuring location privacy, Hoh and Gruteser [20] and Fis-
cher et al. [15] propose two metrics, which are similar to each
other, to compute system location privacy. The latter met-
ric is proposed for measuring data privacy in general, yet
focuses on location data as sensitive information, whereas
the former is more specialized for location privacy.
The c-metrics measure location privacy based on the ad-
versary’s success in attacking the system in the following
way. The adversary’s goal here is to partition the observed
events into multiple subsets, each for one user. As the adver-
sary is not necessarily certain about the actual set partitions,
it hypothesizes a number of set partitions in a probabilistic
manner. The adversary’s expected partitioning error repre-
sents the system level location privacy.
The adversary partitions the set of observed events R̂|obs
into k subsets, where each subset hypothesizes the observed
events associated with one user. The set of all possible set
partitions for R̂|obs is denoted by Ψ. Let ψ be one such set
partition in Ψ. Two observed events eˆi and eˆj are equivalent
in ψ, i.e., eˆi ∼ψ eˆj , if both belong to the same subset in ψ.
Thus, the equivalence relation ∼ψ partitions R̂|obs into k
disjoint subsets denoted by R̂′i|ψobs, where R̂′i|ψobs represents
the set of observed events associated with a user indexed by
i in the set partition ψ.
A distance function, defined separately by each of the two
metrics, estimates the adversary’s error by comparing each
hypothesized set partition with the actual one (i.e., the one
associated with relation ∼). In both metrics, it is assumed
that there is no uncertainty about the location of the ob-
served events (i.e., the location-stamp of an event is a single
location and not an area). The two metrics mainly differ in
the way the adversary’s expected error is computed. Thus,
in order to distinguish between them, we refer to the metric
in [20] as c˙-metric and that in [15] as c¨-metric.
c˙-metric.
To compute the location privacy based on c˙-metric, Hoh
and Gruteser [20] assume that the adversary knows the num-
ber of users in the system (i.e., k = n). It is also assumed
that ∀u ∈ U , Tu|obs = T |obs, which means that the observed
traces for all the users are synchronized. These assumptions
also imply that, for every time instance in T |obs, the adver-
sary observes a set of n events and each event is associated
with one user. Hence, each set partition ψ ∈ Ψ is composed
of n subsets each with cardinality |T |obs|.
Each subset in a given set partition is identified by an
index. The index function ix maps the set of users to the
set of indices. Each user u ∈ U is manually assigned an
index i ∈ {1...n}. In fact, for a given user u, ixψ(u) is the
set partition ψ that includes the head(R̂u|obs) event.
In order to partition the observed trace, the adversary has
to find perfect matches between each two sets of observed
events belonging to two consecutive time instances in T |obs.2
It is assumed that the users velocity at each observed event is
known and that the mobile users move smoothly in the space
(i.e., they do not have sharp turns). Then, inspired from a
multi-target tracking (MTT) algorithm [5], a linear Kalman
model is used to estimate the probability of the possible set
partitions and also the linkability between observed events
(modeled in our framework by pil(.)).
Let eˆψu,t be the event in R̂′i|obs that is observed at time in-
stance t ∈ T |obs and is assigned to user u in the set partition
ψ. Due to the adversary’s uncertainty in partitioning the
observed trace R̂|obs, the event eˆψu,t could be different from
the observed event of user u at time t. Let PrA(eˆ
ψ
u,t) be the
probability that eˆψu,t is the observed event associated with
user u at time t. This probability is equal to pil∗(R̂′i|ψobs≤t),
which is computed in the c˙-metric by the MTT algorithm.
The adversary’s error at time instance t ∈ T |obs, averaged
over all the users, is computed as follows.
D˙ψ(t) =
1
n
·
∑
u
||loc(eˆψu,t)−whereis(u, t)||
where ||.|| denotes the Euclidean distance, and as mentioned
before, loc(eˆψu,t) is considered to be a single location.
Subsequently, the expected error of the set partition ψ,
over all the users and through all the observed time in-
stances, is computed as follows.
E[D˙ψ] =
1∣∣∣T |obs∣∣∣ ·
∑
t∈T |obs
(
D˙ψ(t) ·
∏
u
PrA(eˆ
ψ
u,t)
)
Finally, as shown in (2), the system level location privacy
is computed as the expected error averaged over all probable
set partitions.
LPc˙ =
1
|Ψ| ·
∑
ψ∈Ψ
E[D˙ψ] (2)
2Similar methods can be found in the context of anonymous
communication, e.g., [14, 17].
c¨-metric.
Fischer et al. [15] propose a slightly different approach to
computing the adversary’s expected error in partitioning the
observed events. Instead of using the Euclidean distance to
compute the error of a hypothesized set partition, a set dis-
similarity measure is used. This measure is the normalized
number of different features between any two set partitions.
It is computed as the number of event pairs that are in the
same subset in one set partition but not in the other. Hence,
for a set partition ψ it is estimated as follows.
D¨ψ =
∣∣{(eˆi, eˆj)| (eˆi ∼ψ eˆj ∧ eˆi o eˆj) ∨ (eˆi ψ eˆj ∧ eˆi ∼o eˆj)}∣∣∣∣{(eˆi, eˆj)| eˆi o eˆj}∣∣
where eˆi, eˆj ∈ R̂|obs.
Each set partition ψ is assigned a probability PrA(ψ) that
indicates how probable it is for the adversary to select this
set partition. Finally, the system level location privacy is
computed as the expected value of the partitioning error.
LPc¨ =
∑
ψ∈Ψ
PrA(ψ) · D¨ψ (3)
3.1.3 Traceability-Based Metrics
Traceability-based metrics, t-metrics, capture the extent
to which the adversary can track a user with high certainty.
The traceability is estimated as the length of the time pe-
riod or the distance in location space in which the adversary
can continuously and successfully track a user. Hoh and
Gruteser propose two similar t-metrics [21, 22] that are built
upon u-metrics. More precisely, the success of the adversary
in tracking the users is estimated based on u-metrics. These
two metrics are called Mean time to confusion and Mean
location to confusion. We refer to them as t˙-metric and t¨-
metric, respectively.
An event in the observed trace of a user is called a con-
fusion point if the adversary’s uncertainty is above a given
threshold, Hcf , at that point. More precisely, an observed
event eˆ ∈ R̂u|obs is called a confusion point if LPuu(tm(eˆ)) >
Hcf . Subsequently, the time to confusion is defined as the
period of time before reaching a confusion point, during
which the adversary’s uncertainty remains below Hcf . Lo-
cation to confusion is defined in the same way. Then, the
average value of time/location to confusion for each user rep-
resents his lack of location privacy. To outline it formally,
let R̂u|cfobs represent the set of all confusion points (events)
of user u. Let the union set of the last observed event of
user u and his confusion events be denoted by Cu.
Cu = {tail(R̂u|obs)} ∪ R̂u|cfobs
Let Bu be the set of events that are not confusion points
but are immediate successors of each confusion point in the
observed trace of user u. In addition to these events, Bu
also contains the first observed event from u.
Bu = {head(R̂u|obs)} ∪
{eˆ ∈ R̂u|obs | (eˆ /∈ Cu) ∧ (∃ eˆ′ ∈ Cu s.t. (eˆ′ ≺ eˆ) ∧ (eˆ′ ∼o eˆ))}
Subsequently, a traceable period can be defined as the
time period between an event in Bu and an event in Cu
such that there is no other event in Bu in that time period.
Let Zu be the set of all such traceable periods.
Zu = {(eˆi, eˆj)| (eˆi ∈ Bu) ∧ (eˆj ∈ Cu) ∧ (eˆi ≺ eˆj) ∧
(@ eˆk ∈ Bu s.t. eˆi ≺ eˆk ≺ eˆj)}
Finally, the location privacy of user u based on mean time
to confusion (LPt˙u) and mean location to confusion (LP
t¨
u),
respectively, are computed as follows.
LPt˙u ∝
(∑
(eˆi,eˆj)∈Zu |tm(eˆi)− tm(eˆj)|
|Zu|
)−1
(4)
LPt¨u ∝
(∑
(eˆi,eˆj)∈Zu ||loc(eˆi)− loc(eˆj)||
|Zu|
)−1
(5)
As shown in (4) and (5), the users’ location privacy is
inversely proportional to mean time to confusion and mean
location to confusion values.
3.1.4 K-Anonymity Metric
The concept of k-anonymity was originally proposed by
Samarati and Sweeny [31, 34] as a way to release public in-
formation, and ensure both data privacy and integrity, by
using generalization and suppression techniques: A (data)
release provides k-anonymity protection if the information
for each person contained in the release cannot be distin-
guished from at least k−1 individuals whose information also
appears in the release. Gruteser and Grunwald [19] extended
this concept to the field of location privacy for mobile users
through spatial and temporal cloaking of location and time
information. In this scheme, the users are indistinguishable
from each other and the precision of location-stamps (time-
stamps) of events are decreased to a much larger area (time
period) to satisfy the k-anonymity conditions.
Now, we formalize k-anonymity in our framework. Let
eu,t ∈ Ru be the actual event of user u at time t (i.e.,
tm(eu,t) = t and id(eu,t) = name(u)). Let its correspond-
ing observed event be denoted by eˆu,t = trns(eu,t). Note
that tm(eˆu,t) is a time period (i.e., a set of time instances).
Location privacy of user u based on the k-metric at any
time t such that eˆu,t 6= hidden is the number of distinct
users v (including u himself) for whom there exists one time
instance t′ ∈ tm(eˆu,t) at which the following three condi-
tions are satisfied: (1) The actual location of user v at time
t′ is in the location area of eˆu,t, (2) The time period and
location area of eˆv,t′ are the same as those of eˆu,t, and (3)
The pseudonyms of any such user v is equal to that of user
u (i.e., id(eˆu,t) is a group pseudonym, e.g.,  [19]).
LPku(t) = |{v ∈ U | ∃ t′ ∈ tm(eˆu,t) s.t. (id(eˆv,t′) = id(eˆu,t))
∧(tm(eˆu,t) = tm(eˆv,t′)) ∧ (loc(eˆu,t) = loc(eˆv,t′))
∧(whereis(v, t′) ∈ loc(eˆu,t))}| (6)
Finally, user u is k-anonymous if LPku(t) ≥ k.
3.2 Discussion
In this section, we propose a set of criteria for analyzing
location privacy metrics. These criteria are derived from the
definition of location privacy.
Criterion 1 – Probability of Error: The adversary faces
a classification problem in its reconstruction attack (e.g., he
has to answer the following questions: “To whom should an
observed event be linked?”; or, “Which observed events are
linkable to each other?”). Due to the uncertainty of the ad-
versary, the attack is probabilistic in nature with the adver-
sary assigning probabilities to different choices. The adver-
sary’s objective is to select the most probable option, thus
minimizing its probability of error. Therefore, the user’s lo-
cation privacy is more related to the adversary’s probability
of error in choosing the right option rather than to its uncer-
tainty in the selection process. In order to clarify the case,
let us consider the following examples. Let eˆi, eˆj , eˆk ∈ R̂|obs,
eˆi ∈ R̂u|obs for user u ∈ U , pil(eˆi, eˆj)  pil(eˆi, eˆk) and
pil(eˆi, eˆj) + pi
l(eˆi, eˆk) = 1. It means that it is much more
probable for the adversary to select eˆk, rather than eˆj , as the
immediate successor of eˆi. Obviously, the location privacy of
user u is very low if in fact eˆk ∈ R̂u|obs, and conversely, the
user enjoys a high level of privacy if eˆj ∈ R̂u|obs because the
adversary fails to track u successfully. Uncertainty-based
metrics cannot capture this factor because the adversary’s
uncertainty depends on the the aggregation of pil(eˆi, eˆj) and
pil(eˆi, eˆk) values (when the entropy is computed) and there-
fore is the same whether eˆi ∼o eˆk or not. As another ex-
ample, consider two users u, v ∈ U who are k-anonymous
with k = 2. The users’ privacy is considered to be the same
no matter what is the probability the adversary assigns to
users u and v to be associated with the observed events from
them. In fact, because k-metrics measure the privacy based
on the size of the anonymity set, they implicitly assume that
users in the anonymity set are equally likely to be linked to
the observed events of that set. Hence, k-anonymity metrics
also do not capture the probability of error.
Criterion 2 – Tracking Error: The distance between the
actual location of a user and his location predicted by the
adversary represents the accuracy of the attacker in tracking
the user. Therefore, a location privacy metric should take
this tracking error into account. Metrics that do not consider
the distance between the actual location and the adversary’s
determined location of users are not able to capture this
criterion. Consider again the first example mentioned in
Criterion 1. Let eˆj = trns(ej) and eˆk = trns(ek). No
matter what the distance between loc(eˆj) and loc(ej) (or
the distance between loc(eˆk) and loc(ek)) is, the measured
location privacy of user u using uncertainty-based metrics
is the same. This was already observed and mentioned in
[15, 20]. The k-metric also does not capture the adversary’s
error in localizing a user based on the event observed from
him: a user with anonymity set size k has the same privacy
level, irrespective of the size of its observed-event’s location-
stamp and the distance between the user’s actual location
and the location predicted by the adversary.
Criterion 3 – Actual Trace: In order to estimate the
tracking success of an adversary, the users’ actual traces
must be taken into account. Apart from c˙-metric that con-
siders only a partial set of users’ actual traces, for those
events with time-stamp in T |obs, none of the other metrics
considers this factor. Moreover, the c˙-metric does not con-
vey anything about the adversary’s success in time instances
in which no event from a user is observed. This is crucial
in order to capture the effects of the number and the distri-
bution of the observed events associated with a user. If a
metric does not capture this criterion, it is not possible for
a location privacy preserving mechanism to select the best
events to be eliminated in order to maximize the privacy of
the users. It becomes more obvious, especially if the gap
between two subsequent observed events is large (e.g., be-
fore entering and after exiting a city), where the user might
enjoy a high level of privacy yet it is not captured in the
metrics outlined in Section 3.1.
Criterion 4 – Location/Time Sensitivity: The amount
of information that the location/time pair in an event re-
veals about the identity of its associated user differs from
one user to another. Therefore, location/time sensitivity
plays an important role in a user’s location privacy. Any lo-
cation privacy metric has to take this into account in order
to accurately illustrate the privacy of each user. Yet, none
of the studied metrics satisfy this criterion.
Criterion 5 – Measuring the Traceability: A location
privacy metric must be able to capture when, where, how
accurately, and for how long the adversary is able to track
a user. The longer a user is trackable, the lower his location
privacy is; hence the higher the chance of his actual iden-
tity disclosure will be. “Clustering error”-based metrics, for
example, do not assess traceability of the users. As an ex-
ample, consider two anonymous users that are initially far
from each other, move towards a meeting point and then
move away again. At the meeting point, the adversary is
uncertain about how to make a link between the observed
events immediately before and after the meeting. However,
the adversary’s uncertainty in reconstructing other parts of
their trajectories is low (because their trajectories are far
from each other in other parts). In this case, the location
privacy of both users is very high according to c-metrics, es-
pecially if the adversary’s probability of error is high at the
meeting point. But, in reality both users are fully trackable
during most of the time (from the start to the meeting point
and from the meeting point to the end). Similarly, the k-
metric also does not capture this criterion because it focuses
on observed events individually rather than the relationship
of the events with each other.
Criterion 6 – Genericity: One of the most important
characteristics of a good metric is its applicability in mea-
suring the effectiveness of different privacy preserving tech-
niques (explained in Section 2). Virtually all of the met-
rics in Section 3.1 are designed for specific privacy preserv-
ing mechanisms. These mechanisms are composed of three
methods: Elimination, obfuscation, and anonymization. In
order to evaluate how a metric captures the effects of a pri-
vacy preserving method, we consider each one individually.
• Elimination: Eliminating more events increases the
users’ privacy. However, none of the metrics outlined
in Section 3.1 can capture this effect. This is because in
this case (when there is elimination and no anonymity
and obfuscation) the adversary has no error or uncer-
tainty, no matter what the rate of elimination is.
• Obfuscation: No uncertainty-based metric (or any met-
ric derived from it) can capture the effects of this
method. This is because these metrics do not take
the adversary’s error into account. Even the k-metrics
cannot effectively measure the privacy provided by this
method, because they only consider the size of the
anonymity set rather than the location area (time-
period) in which a user’s location (time) is obfuscated.
• Anonymization: All of the studied metrics can capture
this method’s effects on location privacy.
Criterion 7 – Measurement Granularity: A metric is
more effective if it can measure the location privacy at dif-
ferent granularities, e.g., user level, and system level. “Clus-
tering error”-based metrics, as they give the location privacy
only at the system level, cannot reflect the location privacy
of the each user individually.
4. DISTORTION-BASED METRIC
In this section, we first give a formal description of distortion-
based metric. Next, we present a comparative analysis of our
metric based on the set of criteria discussed earlier.
4.1 Description of the Metric
The adversary’s reconstruction process is the reverse of
the privacy preserving mechanism employed in a system
(i.e., the transformation function). It is about finding the
relationship among the observed events and recreating any
information that has been lost during the transformation.
This is done by hypothesizing the set of actual events that
are eliminated or obfuscated. Considering the possible routes
in the geographic space in which the users move and the
adversary’s knowledge about the users’ mobility patterns,
some of the events are more likely than others to be the ac-
tual events. Hence, the adversary attempts to remove the
uncertainty of the obfuscated events by replacing them with
their representative events that have the highest probabil-
ity of being the actual events. It also predicts the probable
events between any two consecutive events that are elimi-
nated in the transformation. We capture this by defining the
notion of routes between the representatives of the observed
events. Next, we extend the linkability graph to include such
hypothesized events. This graph reflects the possible events
that the adversary could consider as the actual events of the
users. Using this graph, we estimate the location privacy
by computing the expected distortion in the reconstruction
attack with regards to the actual trace of the users.
We define function rep : R̂|obs → E to represent the rep-
resentative of the observed events. An event eˆ′ = rep(eˆ)
is called the representative of an observed event eˆ if it con-
tains the most probable location in loc(eˆ) in which eˆ could
have happened. The representative of any event is com-
puted from the adversary’s knowledge about the probability
distribution of users. The identity of the representative of
an observed event is the same as that of the observed event.
In the following, whenever we refer to the observed events
we mean their corresponding representative events.
A trace Υij is called a route between two events ei and ej ,
if head(Υij) = eˆi, tail(Υij) = eˆj ,
∣∣−→tm(Υij)∣∣ = |Υij |,
and also ∀eˆx ∈ Υij , the following holds: ∃ ey ∈ Υij s.t.
tm(ex) = tm(ey) + 1 ∧ PrA((ey 4 ex) ∧ (ey ∼o ex)) > 0.
This means that the set of events in a route are continuous
in time and each event is the immediate successor of its
predecessor in the route. We denote by Routes(ei, ej) the
set of all the possible routes between events ei and ej .
Let eˆi, eˆj ∈ V l be two events such that pil(eˆi, eˆj) > 0.
This implies that it is probable that the adversary believes
eˆi ∼o eˆj and eˆi 4 eˆj (i.e., both of the observed events are
associated with the same user and eˆj is the immediate suc-
cessor of eˆi). If tm(eˆj) 6= tm(eˆi) + 1, then there must be
a set of events (i.e., a trace) between tm(eˆi) and tm(eˆj)
associated with the same user, which are eliminated during
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Figure 4: Example of extended graph Gx. Arrows in-
dicate the edges in the graph and the circles indicate
the vertices. Solid circles represent the observed
events’ representatives and dashed circles represent
the events added in the extension procedure.
the transformation. A route in Routes(ei, ej) is a possible
hypothesis for such an eliminated trace.
We extend the linkability graph Gl by considering the
routes between the observed events. Let Gx = (V x, Ex, pix)
denote the extended linkability graph. The set of vertices
and edges of the graph are represented by V x and Ex, re-
spectively. The weight function pix in Gx is defined similarly
to that of graph Gl based on the adversary’s knowledge, and
there is the following relation between them.
pil(eˆi, eˆj) =
∑
Υ∈Routes(eˆi,eˆj)
pix∗(Υ)
where pix∗(Υ) is the probability assigned to a trace Υ. It
says that the probability assigned to any edge in the routes
between two observed events eˆi and eˆj collectively determine
the probability the adversary assigns to the link (eˆi, eˆj).
The representatives of the events in V l are in V x. All
events that belong to any route between any pair of linked
events in V l are added to V x.
V x = −−→rep(V l)∪
{
eˆ ∈ Υij
∣∣Υij ∈ Routes(eˆi, eˆj), (eˆi, eˆj) ∈ El}
Subsequently, Ex is defined by creating links between
events in V x based on pix, as we did previously for graph
Gl. Figure 4 represents an example of the extended graph
Gx for the scenario represented in Figure 2(b).
In graph Gx, all the events in V x with time-stamp equal
to T are the only events that are potentially the tails of
traces, because there is no event that can happen afterwards.
Hence, pix(e, e) = 0 for every e ∈ V x such that tm(e) 6=
T . Moreover, there is a self loop for every event e ∈ V x
such that tm(e) = T . Besides, for every e ∈ V x we have∑
e′∈V x pi
x(e, e′) = 1.
Now, we define a specific path in graph Gx, called Tpath,
based on which we estimate the possible set of events that
might be hypothesized for each user. This will be used
in computing the distortion of the hypothesized traces and
eventually the users’ location privacy. Let t ∈ T , e ∈ V x
s.t. tm(e) < t and Υ be a path in Gx. The path Υ is called
a Tpath from e until t, if the following holds.
head(Υ) = e, tm
(
tail(Υ)
)
= t, |Υ| = t− tm(e) + 1
The set of all Tpaths from e until t is denoted by Tpaths(e, t).
Any path Υ ∈ Tpaths(e, t) represents a possible trace that
can be hypothesized by the adversary when it tracks a user
from one of his observed events e until time instance t.
We define the expected distortion in a reconstructed trace
of user u ∈ U at time instance t ∈ T denoted by ED(u, t) as
follows. Let et = tail(R̂u|obs≤t) be the last observed event
from user u before time instance t. Then, we have:
ED(u, t) =
∑
Υ
D
(
whereis(u, t), loc
(
tail(Υ)
)) · pix∗(Υ)
where Υ ∈ Tpaths(et, t) and function D : V s × V s → [0, 1]
is a normalized distance function between two locations.
Thus, for estimating the distortion of the reconstructed
event of user u at time instance t, first we find the latest
event from u observed at or before time instance t, which is
denoted by et. Then, we take all the paths that start from
et and end in any event with time-stamp equal to t. The
location-stamp of these events represents the hypothesized
locations of the user u at time instance t, each assigned a
probability. Considering these probabilities we can compute
the expected distortion of the location of u at instance t.
To compute a user’s location privacy, we also take his
personal location/time sensitivity factor into account. This
is because the amount of information that can be inferred
from the observed events of the users for finding their actual
identities is highly user dependent [18, 27]. For example, if
an event is observed from a user when he is at home at
midnight, then it is easy for the adversary to find the ac-
tual identity associated with that event. In other words,
de-anonymization of those events that belong to sensitive
loction/time pairs are easier for the adversary. A user’s sen-
sitivity to his own location information over time is captured
by the location/time sensitivity function lts : U ×V s×T →
[0, 1]. The higher the level of distortion around sensitive lo-
cations of a user is, the higher his location privacy is. Sub-
sequently, we compute the distortion-based location privacy
of a user u ∈ U at time t ∈ T as follows.
LPdu(t) = 1− lts
(
u,whereis(u, t), t
) · (1− ED(u, t)) (7)
Given the location privacy of a user u at any time instance
t, the overall location privacy of the user can be computed
as his average location privacy over T , as follows.
LPdu =
1
T
·
∑
t∈T
LPdu(t) (8)
The traceability of a user can be computed similarly to
time/location to confusion metrics outlined in Section 3.1.3.
To compute the distortion-based traceability, first, we re-
define the confusion point in a user’s trace as the time in-
stance in which the amount of distortion is above a thresh-
old. Moreover as opposed to t-metrics, we take into account
all the time instances in T , and not only those in T |obs.
The system-level location privacy, i.e., the overall privacy
of users, is computed as LPd = 1
n
∑
u LP
d
u. The minimum
level of privacy provided to the users, i.e., minu
(
LPdu
)
, can
also be computed for the worst case analysis.
4.2 Discussion
In the proposed distortion-based metric, a user’s loca-
tion privacy is estimated as the level of distortion in his
actual trace reconstructed by reversing the privacy preserv-
ing mechanisms. The metric also considers the sensitivity of
a user’s location information over time.
We propose a list of criteria for location privacy metrics
in Section 3.2 and show that existing metrics capture only
a subset of the criteria as they consider only part of the ad-
versary’s knowledge and part of the information contained
in the actual events. Hence, these metrics effectively cap-
ture location privacy only in some specific scenarios. Our
metric leverages on the strengths of existing metrics out-
lined in Section 3.1 and also fulfills all the proposed crite-
ria. More specifically, our metric considers the probability
of a hypothesized trajectory for a user at any time instance
and its expected distance to the actual location of the user
and hence satisfies the first three criteria (i.e., Probability
of error, Tracking error, and Actual trace). This distortion
is weighted based on the users’ personal sensitivity to dif-
ferent locations at different time instances. This is crucial
for computing the users’ location privacy and thus fulfilling
criterion 4 (i.e., Location/Time sensitivity). Additionally,
our metric computes the users traceability in the same way
as t-metrics; hence fulfilling criterion 5 (i.e., Measuring the
traceability). As our metric is based on the process of recon-
struction by the adversary and the uncertainty associated
with it, it is able to effectively capture the effects of the
various location privacy preserving methods, namely, elim-
ination, obfuscation, and anonymization. Thus, our metric
also satisfies criterion 6 (i.e., Genericity). Lastly, criterion 7
(i.e., Measurement granularity) is fulfilled as we compute
the users’ privacy at any time instance, their overall privacy
and also the system level privacy.
From our analysis of the existing location privacy metrics
presented in Section 3 and the description of our distortion-
based metric in Section 4.1, it is clear that the proposed for-
mal framework, specifically the linkability graph model (Sec-
tion 2.5), clearly captures the required criteria to measure lo-
cation privacy. In particular, the adversary model assumed
in existing metrics and the proposed distortion-based met-
ric can also be captured within the linkability graph-based
model. The distortion-based metric measures the location
privacy of a user at a given time instance by computing the
expected distance between the actual and the hypothesized
path in the extended graph, beginning from the last observed
event before that time instance. Hence, in practice, only a
small part of the extended linkability graph is required at
each step of the privacy computation. Consequently, irre-
spective of the overall size of the extended graph, such a
piece-wise computation is an important efficiency feature of
the distortion-based metric. The u-metrics and k-metrics
are even simpler to compute within the current framework.
The c-metrics and the t-metrics, on the contrary, generally
require much more information about the linkability graph
structure for the time period during which the user privacy
has to be estimated. This can have computation space (and
time) implications depending on the size of the linkability
graph used in these metrics.
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we proposed a formal framework to model
location privacy; it is general enough to capture the notion
of privacy under different types of location privacy preserv-
ing mechanisms. In order to provide a common platform for
evaluating the existing location privacy metrics, we short-
listed a set of criteria derived from the location privacy re-
quirements in a mobile network setting. Based on these
criteria and with the help of some representative counter-
examples, we showed that existing metrics do not capture
location privacy completely in all cases. Finally, we pro-
posed a novel distortion-based metric for measuring location
privacy under a variety of privacy preserving mechanisms,
which also fulfills all the proposed set of criteria.
We would like to extend the existing framework in or-
der to model time obfuscation methods for location privacy.
Further, we would like to show some concrete scenarios in
which the proposed metric can be applied and address the
implementation and computation specific issues in such tar-
get scenarios.
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